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Conceiving and Executing
Operation Gauntlet
The Canadian-Led Raid on Spitzbergen, 1941
R Y A N D E A N & P. W H I T N E Y L A C K E N B A U E R
Abstract : In August and September 1941, Canadian Brigadier Arthur
Potts led a successful but little known combined operation by a small
task force of Canadian, British, and Norwegian troops in the Spitzbergen
(Svalbard) archipelago in the Arctic Ocean. After extensive planning and
political conversations between Allied civil and military authorities, the
operation was re-scaled so that a small, mixed task force would destroy
mining and communications infrastructure on this remote cluster of
islands, repatriate Russian miners and their families to Russia, and
evacuate Norwegian residents to Britain. While a modest non-combat
mission, Operation Gauntlet represented Canada’s first expeditionary
operation in the Arctic, yielding general lessons about the value of
specialized training and representation from appropriate functional
trades, unity of command, operational secrecy, and deception, ultimately
providing a boost to Canadian morale. Interactions also demonstrated
the complexities of coalition warfare as well as the challenges associated
with civil-military interaction in the theatre of operations.
Brigadier [A.E.] Potts and his officers and men had ... been the
chief actors in an episode unique in military history, and one which
illustrated in singularly striking fashion the extent of a conflict which
far better than that of 1914-18, deserves the title of World War. No
previous struggle between modern states had brought the Arctic seas so
definitely with its scope; and never before had a military force advanced
so close to the North Pole. Before this unpredictable war has run its
course, Canadian soldiers may serve in other strange corners of the
world; but it may be doubted whether any detachment will find itself
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operating in a more remote area than that which fell to the lot of the
expedition to Spitsbergen.
– C.P. Stacey (1942)1

I

August and S eptember 1941, Brigadier Arthur Potts, the
officer commanding 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade, led a
successful combined operation by a small task force of Canadian,
British, and Norwegian troops in the Spitzbergen archipelago. This
remote cluster of islands, situated on the Arctic Ocean route to
Russia’s northern ports, had assumed heightened strategic importance
after the German invasion of Russia two months earlier. Part of a
series of initiatives undertaken by the British at the insistence of
the Soviets to establish and secure an Arctic convoy route between
the newfound allies, Operation Gauntlet wrecked the valuable coal
mines of Spitzbergen and their supporting infrastructure, destroyed
the archipelago’s wireless and meteorological stations, repatriated
the Russian mining population working there to Archangel, and
evacuated all the Norwegians on Spitzbergen to Britain.
Gauntlet is notable for being Canada’s first expeditionary
operation in the Arctic and for being one of only two operations in
1941 that took Canadian troops beyond the confines of the United
Kingdom.2 Like the better-known Canadian contribution to the us -led,
unopposed invasion of the Aleutian island of Kiska in August 1943,3
the operation at Spitzbergen did not involve combat against an enemy
force. Consequently, it is generally overlooked in the historiography
of the Canadian Army during the Second World War. Official army
historian C.P. Stacey wrote a short wartime article on Gauntlet in
Canadian Geographical Journal 4 highlighting some of the soldiers’
experiences for the public and dedicated a few pages in Six Years
n

1  
C.P. Stacey, “The Canadians at Spitsbergen,” Canadian Geographical Journal 245:5 (1942): 71.
2  
The other operation involved the deployment of Canadian sappers to the fortresses
of Gibraltar. See C.P. Stacey, Six Years of War (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1955), 299.
3  
On Canadian contributions to Operation Cottage, see Stacey, Six Years of War,
492-505; Brian Garfield, The Thousand Mile War (Fairbanks: University of Alaska
Press, 1995) and Galen Perras, Stepping Stones to Nowhere: The Aleutian Islands,
Alaska, and American Military Strategy, 1867-1945 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003).
As a result of a friendly-fire incident, Japanese booby-traps, and ammunition
incidents, four Canadians and 28 Americans were killed during the Kiska operation.
4  
See Stacey, “Canadians at Spitsbergen,” 49-73.
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of War to outlining the operation from a Canadian perspective.5
American officer Donald Bittner elaborated on the operational
experiences covered in Stacey’s original article some twenty-five
years later, nesting Gauntlet within the larger context of the Allied
occupation of Iceland,6 while a recent article by French historian
Éric Coutu situates the raid in the early wartime development of
Britain’s Combined Operations Headquarters.7 Beyond these sources
and a handful of memoirs,8 few commentators seem to consider this
relatively minor Arctic operation worthy of serious consideration.
This article situates and analyzes Gauntlet in its larger strategic
context, explaining how and why the operation evolved into the form
that it did—and the Canadian role in it. The scope of the operation
reflected the complexities of coalition warfare, demonstrated by the
interplay between Soviet political pressure for aggressive Allied action
in the Arctic and the limited British military capability to meet these
demands. Ultimately representing a compromise between the political
objective of heartening the Russians and the military objective of
securing the new Arctic convoy route, Operation Gauntlet satisfied
neither strategic objective in attempting to accomplish both.
At the tactical level, however, Brigadier Potts’ force carried
out its limited mission with complete success. The enemy did not
interfere with the operation, and not a single soldier or sailor was lost.
Furthermore, Gauntlet gave a few hundred Canadians an adventure
and a taste of active employment after weary months of waiting in
Britain. While the operation provided a boost to Canadian morale,
interactions between the Canadians and some local civilian authorities
See C.P. Stacey, Six Years of War, 301-07, which includes a full-page map of
Spitzbergen.
6  
Donald F. Bittner, “Descent in the North - The 1941 Canadian raid on Spitsbergen,”
Canadian Defence Quarterly 11:4 (1982): 28-34. In broader context, see Bittner,
“The British Occupation of Iceland, 1940-1942” (University of Missouri – Colombia,
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1974).
7  
Éric Coutu, “Le quartier général des opérations combinées et l’expédition canadobritannique au Spitzberg (août 1941),” Guerre mondiale et des conflits contemporains
220/5 (2004): 45-69. See also Coutu, «Les missions effectuées par le Quartier général
des opérations combinées de 1940 à 1942» (Université de la Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris 3, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 2005).
8  
See, for example, Ross Munro, Gauntlet to Overlord: The Story of the Canadian
Army (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1946); Sir Philip Vian,
Action This Day: A War Memoir (London: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1960); and
Alexander Glen, Footholds Against a Whirlwind (London: Hutchinson of London,
1975).
5  
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revealed the challenges associated with civil-military interaction in
the theatre of operations, the need for creative and practical problem
solving, and the requirement to correct misinformation at the
diplomatic level. Despite these challenges, Operation Gauntlet, in the
words of C.P. Stacey, “accomplished everything which it set out to
do”9 at the tactical level.

setting the stage: strategic context and operational
planning
The notion of sending an Allied military force to Spitzbergen10 in
August of 1941 was originally a Soviet one. Stalin met Churchill’s
offer of support to the Soviet Union in the wake of the 22 June 1941
German invasion with steep demands: the establishment of a second
front on the European continent to relieve German pressure on the
Red Army and the immediate shipment of Western war materials to
make good Soviet shortages.11 Despite Britain’s strained capabilities
at the time, Churchill strove to meet these demands to keep the
Soviet Union in the war. On 7 July Churchill instructed the British
ambassador in Moscow, Sir Stafford Cripps, to open negotiations for
a mutual aid treaty.12
From the beginning of these negotiations the Soviets attempted
to draw the British into the Arctic. Admiral Nikolay Kuznetsov, the
Soviet Commissar of the Navy, requested that the British send a
naval force to the White Sea to disrupt Germany’s sea-borne supply
route around Norway and undermine General Eduard Dietl’s offensive
against Murmansk.13 Churchill responded positively, commanding
First Sea Lord Admiral Dudley Pound on 12 July to send a squadron
of ships to Archangel, and Pound in turn dispatched a naval
delegation to Murmansk to investigate further naval cooperation

Stacey, “The Canadians at Spitsbergen,” 71.
Now commonly known by its Norwegian name of Svalbard. This paper will use the
geographic names commonly used at the time.
11  
David Wragg, Sacrifice for Stalin: The Cost and Value of the Arctic Convoys ReAssessed (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword, 2005), 49.
12  
Christopher Mann, British Policy and Strategy towards Norway, 1941-45 (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 15.
13  
Philip Vian, Action This Day: A War Memoir (London: Frederick Muller, 1960),
65–66.
9  

10  
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measures such as the basing of British ships in Soviet Arctic ports.14
Stalin had made it clear that he favoured the Murmansk route for
convoying war materials because he was concerned that the Japanese
might cut-off Vladivostok on the Pacific and that the land route
through Iran lacked the infrastructure to be a viable option.15 The
Murmansk convoy route was the shortest and most direct, but also
the most dangerous as Allied ships would have to run a 2,000-mile
long gauntlet around Norway, contending with the threat of German
air and sea attack along with the freezing and tempestuous Barents
Sea.16
The Admiralty, however, did not share the Soviet enthusiasm for
joint action in the Arctic. Admiral Sir John Tovey, Commander-inChief of the Home Fleet, whose stretched command would assume
the burden of these proposed operations, was certainly cool to the
idea. It was vexing from the British perspective, as naval historian
Richard Woodman writes, that Stalin “comprehended little of the
war at sea, an ignorant and infuriating disinterest he was to exhibit
during the whole of the maritime Arctic campaign that he now
expected Churchill to open.”17 In weighing the mismatch between
British military capabilities and Soviet ambitions, Tovey concluded
“that no political object would be served by attempting military
impossibilities.”18 This stance earned Tovey the ire of Churchill who
was coming under increasing political pressure to take concrete action
in supporting the Soviet Union.19

Mann, British Policy and Strategy towards Norway, 15. A force under RearAdmiral W.F. Wake-Walker sailed from Scapa on 23 July comprised of the aircraft
carriers Furious and Victorious and cruisers Devonshire and Suffolk escorted by six
destroyers. The results of their operations against Dietl’s sea-borne supply line were
small. B. B. Schofield, The Russian Convoys (London: B. T. Batsford, 1964), 23-24.
15  
Robert Carse, A Cold Corner of Hell (Garden City, New York: Doubleday &
Company, Inc., 1969), 12.
16  
James Levy, “The Needs of Political Policy versus the Reality of Military
Operations: Royal Navy Opposition to the Arctic Convoys, 1942,” The Journal of
Strategic Studies 26:1 (2003): 38 and Schofield, The Russian Convoys, 24.
17  
Richard Woodman, The Arctic Convoys (London: John Murray Ltd, 1994), 8.
18  
Quoted in Vian, Action This Day, 73.
19  
Mann, British Policy and Strategy towards Norway, 15.

14  
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On 15 July, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav
Molotov floated a scheme of his own during a meeting with Cripps.20
He suggested that Anglo-Soviet cooperation be extended to cover
an occupation of Spitzbergen and Bear Island which flanked the sea
lane from Britain to the Soviet Union. “This would enable a secure
sea lane to be made from Archangel to the West and would also give
facilities for air service between the countries,” Cripps noted in his
report of the meeting. There were 1,500 Soviet miners on Spitzbergen
who could be armed to garrison the archipelago for Allied use. With
the sea lane secured, Cripps recounted that Molotov outlined a plan
that would use Soviet troops supported by the British to drive the
Germans from northern Norway. “The idea seems to me a good one,”
Cripps reported to his Foreign Office, “especially as reads the Islands
and it should present no difficulty and would protect Soviet miners
in Spitzbergen from possible German raids.”21 The British quickly
rejected any large-scale military operations in northern Norway,
however, given that this would divert naval and air assets from more
pressing commitments elsewhere.22
Aware of the mounting political pressure for action, the British
Chiefs of Staff (cos) saw the benefits in occupying Spitzbergen
and Bear Island. By 17 July, the British Joint Planning Staff (jps)
reported to the War Cabinet that “the alliance between Great
Britain and Russia has given Spitzbergen a strategical value which it
did not previously possess.”23 Given its position astride the sea lines
of communication between Britain and northern Russia, control of
the archipelago mattered. If the Allies cut off the supply of highquality coal to Norway, this would have economic implications for
the German war effort. Furthermore, Spitzbergen could be used as
a refuelling base for Allied shipping to Murmansk and to support
Allied aviation in the area. Noting the constraints on British forces,
the jps “consider[ed] that Spitzbergen should be occupied provided

Despite General Filipp Golikov and Admiral Kuznetov being present at the
meeting between Molotov and Cripps, the British Military Mission in Moscow
understood the idea to have been Molotov’s. No.30 Military Mission Moscow to War
Office, 15 July 1941, The National Archives (TNA), file CAB 121/442.
21  
From Moscow to Foreign Office, 15 July 1941, TNA, file FO 371/29487.
22  
From Chiefs of Staff to No. 30 Military Mission in Moscow, 19 July 1941, TNA,
file WO 106/1998.
23  
Joint Planning Staff to the War Cabinet, “Operations in the North,” 17 July 1941,
TNA, file CAB 121/442.
20  
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the Russians are prepared to provide the necessary army garrison.”24
The cos approved the operation contingent on the Norwegian
government-in-exile giving their consent.25
Negotiations between the British, the Norwegians, and the
Soviets soon yielded consent to mount a joint operation along one
of two lines: evacuating the miners from Spitzbergen or occupying
the archipelago. British planners initially focused on the latter
option, which would deny the “important areas” to Germany and
allow the Allies to defend an anchorage for shipping. According to
their plan, a force would garrison Spitzbergen until it froze over in
October. Intelligence appraisals assumed that the landing would be
unopposed—an important assumption given that all British assault
craft were allotted to the pending Operation Pilgrim (the proposed
British seizure of Portugal’s Canary Islands), thereby making it
“impossible to equip an expedition to Spitzbergen which will be capable
of overcoming anything more than the very slightest opposition.”26
On 24 July, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir John Dill,
met with the commander of the Canadian Corps, Lieutenant-General
A.G.L. McNaughton, to informally offer the developing operation to
him and his troops. McNaughton readily agreed, and the next day
the War Office officially approached the Canadian Army to provide
the troops to defend the proposed naval anchorage and refuelling
base at Spitzbergen.27
McNaughton’s enthusiasm for Canadian action was unsurprising.
His soldiers, eager for active service since their arrival in Britain
in December 1939, had “found themselves committed instead to a
defensive and largely static role” for the next two years.28 However
vital this anti-invasion role may have seemed, it was no replacement
for actual battle indoctrination. Canadian units had been tapped
for proposed British operations in Norway, the Low Countries, and
France earlier in the war, but these plans had all been cancelled,

Ibid.
Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, 17 July 1941, TNA, file CAB 121/442.
26  
Joint Planning Staff, “Spitzbergen,” 23 July 1941, TNA, file CAB 84/33.
27  
Instructions for the Preparation of Force 111, 25 July 1941, Library and Archives
Canada (LAC), file RG24 C-2 Vol 12298.
28  
Stacey, The Canadians in Britain, 11–12.
24  
25  
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leaving the Canadian field force “bitterly disappointed.”29 Although
the subsequent German invasion of the Soviet Union made an attack
against England increasingly unlikely, two restrictions kept the
Canadians confined to England. First, McNaughton had insisted that
the Canadian Corps remain together so that British commanders
did not siphon off units piecemeal. This earned him a wrongful
reputation for wanting to keep the Canadians out of fighting when,
in the assessment of historian John Rickard, he had demonstrated
“a sincere willingness to consider any and all requests from the
War Office for Canadian forces to join the fighting” in Europe.30
Second, Canadian Minister of National Defence J.L. Ralston, having
crossed swords with McNaughton about the general’s unilateral
decision to commit Canadian troops to Norway the previous year,
ruled that Canadian troops could not be moved out of England
without government consent. Thus, McNaughton was limited to
pursuing raiding opportunities so that his men could acquire combat
experience. At the end of June 1941 he had sent a representative to
the War Office to explore opportunities along these lines.31 Now, a
month later, the War Office was offering one.
With McNaughton on board, senior Canadian officers met with
representatives from several British War Office branches on 26 July
to devise a plan for Operation Flaxman. “The proposal made at this
time was for a considerably more ambitious enterprise than the one
finally carried out,” Stacey observed. The basic intent was to deploy
effectively an infantry brigade, less one battalion, to Spitzbergen to
occupy the islands until the end of October. According to this plan,
“Force 111” would primarily comprise an infantry battalion from the
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (ppcli) and an infantry

Ibid, 22-26. On earlier aborted plans for Canadians to engage in combat and the
resulting frustration of Canadian soldiers, see The Canadians in Britain 1939-1944
(Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1944), 22-26; and David J. Bercuson, Maple Leaf Against
the Axis (Toronto: Stoddart, 1995), 62-65.
30  
John N. Rickard, The Politics of Command: Lieutenant-General A.G.L.
McNaughton and the Canadian Army (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010),
40-41, 52-53.
31  
Bercuson, Maple Leaf Against the Axis, 65; John Swettenham, McNaughton 18871943, Vol. 2 (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1969), 181; and Rickard, Politics of
Command, 41-43.
29  
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battalion from the Edmonton Regiment.32 The British would provide
ancillary units and additional supplies.33 Information on German
activities on Spitzbergen was scanty, but planners continued to expect
an unopposed landing.
The Canadian Military Headquarters (cmhq) eagerly threw
itself into planning Flaxman, but the War Office continued to shape
the character of the operation—and to raise doubts about whether
it should proceed. Senior British officers voiced concerns about a
possible German air threat to the operation, but McNaughton did
not see this as a serious risk. “Any air attack would be limited,”
a contemporary report noted, “and he was of the opinion that the
expedition should not be cancelled on account of the danger of air
attack.” The Canadians could adopt passive defence (troop dispersion
and slit trenches) to withstand a German attack, and the force did
have one light anti-aircraft battery. Brigadier Arthur Potts, the
commander designate of Force 111, concurred.34 Besides, McNaughton
argued, the threat of air attack was worthwhile if it meant drawing
off German bombers from somewhere more important like the Soviet
front.35 Having heard McNaughton’s appraisal of the risks, the War
Office decided to proceed with preparations for Flaxman, but delayed
launching the operation until more intelligence could be collected
on the archipelago.36 Based on the assumption that the project had
been approved by the British War Committee, the Canadian War
Committee told McNaughton on 31 July that it was:
[…] quite prepared to have you act on your own judgement as to whether
to cooperate and to what extent. In arriving at a decision you will no
C.P. Stacey noted the similarity between this order of battle and the Canadian
force provided for service in Norway in April 1940. Canadian Military Headquarters
(CMHQ) Historical Report No.56, “The Spitzbergen Operation, August-September
1941” (20 December 1941), 2-3. These two regiments had been thwarted from
seeing action in Norway the previous year when that operation was cancelled.
G.R. Stevens, A City Goes to War: History of the Loyal Edmonton Regiment (3
PPCLI) (Edmonton: Edmonton Regiment Association, 1964), 211. On the secrecy
surrounding the operation, see War Diary No. 5 Fd. Amb. R.C.A.M.C, Force 111, 27
July 1941, LAC, file RG24 C-3 Vol. 17489.
33  
Minutes of meeting attended at the War Office, 26 July 1941, LAC, file RG24 C-2
Vol. 12298.
34  
Memorandum by Brigadier Murchie, 6 August 1941, LAC, file RG24 C-2 Vol.
12298.
35  
Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, 6 August 1941, TNA, file DEFE 2/228.
36  
Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, 6 August 1941, TNA, file CAB 79/13/0/1.
32  
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doubt have regard to question as to whether prospects of success are
sufficient to warrant risks involved which include not only personnel but
possible encouragement to enemy if results negative or worse. We here
are not in a position to judge of above and other conflicting factors but
prepared to leave decision to your judgement.37

The British War Cabinet approved Operation Flaxman on the
morning of 5 August. cmhq in London issued the secret instruction
“alliance ” to Canadian soldiers, and, the following morning, troops
began to move out of their camps at the town of Oxted, south of
London, to board trains which would take them to Glasgow, from
where they were to be shipped to Spitzbergen.38
In summing up the purpose of Operation Flaxman, the British
Chiefs of Staff commented “that we were operating a fleet in Far
Northern Waters largely for political reasons.” For this fleet “to
operate to the best advantage,” the cos indicated that “it was
necessary to defend the refuelling base at Spitzbergen with a small
garrison.”39 Thus establishing a military objective for the politicallymotivated Flaxman, they concluded that the operation should be
designed to “secure, against seaborne and airborne raids, a harbour,
selected by the Naval Commander as a refuelling base” for Arctic
shipping until October 1941.40

changing course
In the meantime, the cos had sent a naval reconnaissance mission
to the archipelago.41 Consequently, the Admiralty [hq ] received a
signal on the evening of 5 August which fundamentally changed
the nature of the Spitzbergen operation. Rear-Admiral Philip Vian,
the commander of Force “K” then operating in northern waters in

DEFENSOR to CANMILITARY telegram G.S. 203, 31 July 1941, LAC RG25
A-2 Vol 829.
38  
From SEARAIL TWO to Movements Secc, 5 August 1941, LAC, file RG24 C-2
Vol 12298.
39  
Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, 4 August 1941, TNA, file WO 106/1995A.
40  
Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, Annex “Draft Directive to the Military
Commander for an Operation in Spitzbergen,” 5 August 1941, TNA, file
CAB/80/59/0/1.
41  
Joint Planning Staff (41) 584, “Spitzbergen,” 23 July 1941, TNA, file CAB 84/33.
37  
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support of the Soviets, had been part of the initial British naval
delegation sent to Murmansk in mid-July to discern joint naval
arrangements with the Soviets and to scout opportunities for basing
British ships there. His assessment was decidedly negative, noting
that the naval facilities and air defences at Murmansk left much
to be desired, and that the port would only be viable if the British
invested heavily in improving and strengthening it.42 His subsequent
naval reconnaissance of Spitzbergen in search of alternative naval
basing options found the situation there even worse. There were
no Germans on the archipelago, he reported, and “that [while] a
military occupation of Spitsbergen would no doubt be possible… a
naval one was not, because the fiords were iced up for most of the
year.”43 He determined that available harbours in Spitzbergen were
too large for effective anti-submarine and anti-aircraft defences,44 and
the lack of port facilities made it “doubtful if even the redoubtable
American Sea-Bees could have made a base out of those mountainous
and ice-covered islands.”45 Accordingly, he informed the Admiralty
that the “object of heartening Russians will not be achieved by
[a] Naval force based at sea” and recommended that the “project
should be abandoned.”46 Vian’s superior, Admiral Tovey, concurred
fully, echoing that the planned “expedition to Spitzbergen should be
abandoned” on the grounds that “an operational base at Spitzbergen
for units of [the] Fleet is not necessary and if established will form a
commitment which will severely hamper any operations.”47
The cos weighed Vian’s recommendation to abort Flaxman
against the mounting political pressure that Churchill was placing

Woodman, The Arctic Convoys, 11.
Vian, Action This Day, 70.
44  
The most suitable anchorage was a harbour 5 miles wide at its mouth, much
too wide for an effective anti-submarine warfare (ASW) defence. The alternative
anchorage suffered from poor anti-aircraft (A.A.) gun firing positions. Soldiers would
not be able to get from their garrison to their guns fast enough to respond effectively
to a sudden air attack. Regardless, the harbour was so large that the Bofors guns
available had insufficient range to protect the anchorage. Chiefs of Staff Committee,
Spitzbergen Report, 11 August 1941, TNA, file PREM 3/410.
45  
Schofield, The Russian Convoys, 23.
46  
Naval Cypher from S. O. Force A to C. in C. Home Fleet, 5 August 1941, TNA,
file PREM 3/410.
47  
Naval Cypher from C. in C. Home Fleet to Admiralty, 7 August 1941, TNA, file
PREM 3/410.
42  
43  
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on them for Arctic operations in support of the Soviet Union.48
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden had told Soviet Ambassador Ivan
Mikhailovich Maisky on 5 August that, with Soviet approval, the
British would dispatch a force to occupy Spitzbergen three days later.49
Reneging on this promise would have been politically difficult.50
When McNaughton and Potts met with the cos on 6 August to
review the situation, McNaughton, who argued that Admiral Vian
“did not appear to have a clear appreciation of the ‘object’ of the
proposed expedition,”51 requested that Force 111 be sent for training
at the Combined Training Centre at Inverary, Scotland, until the
cos rendered their final decision on whether Flaxman would proceed.
“The troops taking part in the expedition were completely untrained
in combined operations,” McNaughton explained, “and if they could
be held at Inverary they could spend their time most usefully in
practicing beach landings.”52 The committee agreed to McNaughton’s
request and postponed the sailing of Flaxman. It also ordered Vian
to return to London and report to them in person before they made
a final decision as to the fate of the operation.
The 2,000 Canadian troops, “loaded like a bunch of sardines
into the carriages” of trains then heading north to Glasgow, were
completely unaware of the developments at the War Office. The
Canadians had arrived at Oxted’s train station before noon, finding
specialized kit waiting for them. By 12:30 pm the first train had been
packed with kit and men and departed the station for Glasgow. As
Oxted disappeared from view behind them “the general feeling… was
one of relief that the journey had commenced,” noted the Saskatoon
Light Infantry war diarist, “and many wondered whether or not we
should see the village again.”53 Secrecy had been a central element
in the preparations of Flaxman.54 There was plenty of speculation
amongst the men as to what was going to happen to them. As far as
they knew, they were participating in an exercise called “Heather.”
For example see Prime Minister to General Ismay for Chiefs of Staff, 27 July 1941,
TNA, file CAB 120/657.
49  
Mr. Eden to Sir S. Cripps, 5 August 1941, TNA, file FO/954/24B/0/58.
50  
Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, 7 August 1941, TNA, file CAB 121/442.
51  
Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, 6 August 1941, TNA, file WO 106/1995A.
52  
Ibid.
53  
War Diary Saskatoon Light Infantry, Exercise Heather, 27 July 1941, LAC, file
RG24 C-3 Vol. 17489.
54  
Donald F. Bittner, “Descent in the North - The 1941 Canadian raid on
Spitsbergen,” Canadian Defence Quarterly 11:4 (1982): 30.
48  

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol26/iss2/16

12

Dean and Lackenbauer: Conceiving and Executing Operation Gauntlet
DEAN & LACKENBAUER

13

Staff Officer Major A.H. Norrington outlined to the men what they
were about to do but not where they were going. As the Second
Canadian Infantry Brigade war diary notes, the soldiers were simply
told “that we were to do a job of extreme importance, a job that had
to be done before the enemy could get a chance at it. That this job
involved a sea voyage was also given out.”55
Arriving in Glasgow that evening, the Canadian troops
disembarked from the trains and quietly boarded the large transport
ship Empress of Canada. That night the Empress departed Glasgow,
proceeding slowly down the congested Clyde before turning north
and heading up Loch Fyne. At noon on 8 August, the ship dropped
anchor offshore the Special Training Centre (stc) at Inverary. Centre
staff devised an intense training regime for the Canadians, consisting
of two main elements. The first was infantry training: rough country
route marches and cross-country manoeuvers.56 The troops were
subjected to physical exhaustion, exposed to the harsh highland
elements, and then forced to make tactical decisions. They were
also taught to read and sketch maps of the terrain, set demolitions,
and fight in an urban environment.57 The second element of training
was “boat work” wherein the troops practiced landing operations.
This realistic and comprehensive training impressed the officers and
troops, although “the complete lack of air support integrated into the
combined arms training” reaffirmed what Stacey observed to be “a
common army complaint of the period.”58
While the cos awaited the arrival of Vian on 9 August, they tasked
the jps with investigating the economic consequences for Germany
if Flaxman succeeded in shutting off the flow of Spitzbergen coal
to occupied Norway. Military planners consulted with the Ministry
of Economic Warfare, which said it would welcome a stop to the
supply of Spitzbergen coal to occupied Norway in hopes that this
would strain the German economy. The ministry also noted that the
Soviet Union had been importing about 500,000 tons of coal annually
from Spitzbergen and that the Royal Navy could provide coverage to
Russian shipping to re-establish this Arctic coal trade. Furthermore,
Special War Diary 2 CDN INF BDE, Spitzbergen Expedition, 6 August 1941,
LAC, file RG24 C-3 Vol 17489.
56  
CMHQ Historical Report No.56, “The Spitzbergen Operation,” 6.
57  
Military Intelligence Service, British Commandos (Washington DC, US War
Department, 1942), 29, 100.
58  
CMHQ Historical Report No.56, “The Spitzbergen Operation,” 6.
55  
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because “the Germans are very unlikely to get any coal from
Spitzbergen,” the jps concluded that “there is no object in destroying
the facilities of the mines in order to deny the coal to the enemy.” It
advocated for a British policy that would encourage Russian mines
to supply coal to northern Russia to the fullest extent possible. If the
Soviets lost their northern flank, the jps recommended the complete
destruction of all mining facilities and equipment in Spitzbergen,
as well as the withdrawal of all miners. The Ministry of Labour
would happily employ the Norwegian miners in the uk , but given the
unique arrangement that provided for Norwegian sovereignty over
the archipelago, the Norwegian government-in-exile was unlikely to
welcome a proposal that would remove their people from Spitzbergen
while leaving the Russians in place.59
Vian arrived in London on 9 August and immediately reported to
the cos . His Force “K,” consisting of two cruisers and two destroyers,
had visited Spitzbergen on 31 July.60 hms Nigeria visited the main
Norwegian settlement at Longyearby, where the admiral met the
civilian governor of Spitzbergen. Meanwhile, Captain William
Agnew in the cruiser Aurora visited the main Soviet settlement
of Barentsburg, where he was welcomed by Russian Consul F. I.
Wolnuhi. While the community continued to mine, Agnew learned,
the Russians expected a German occupation at any moment.61 Before
the British departed the next day, they seized a Norwegian collier,62
recruited seventy Norwegian miners to serve in the Free Norwegian
Army,63 and installed Royal Norwegian Navy Løjtnant R. A. Tamber
as Military Governor of Spitzbergen. Tamber’s objectives were to
make sure that local residents did not pass any information about
the British visit to the Germans and to ferret out any clandestine
German influence on the islands.64 In his report, Vian reiterated that
the proposed anchorages at Spitzbergen were not defendable and that

Joint Planning Staff Aide Memoire, Spitzbergen, 8 August 1941, TNA, file
CAB/79/13/0/1.
60  
Mathisen, Svalbard in the Changing Arctic, 34.
61  
Vian, Action This Day, 68-69.
62  
The collier Dagney was crewed by twenty Norwegian volunteers and was sunk a
week later by German aircraft while on passage to Scapa Flow. J. G. Elbo, “The War
in Svalbard, 1939-45,” Polar Record 6:44 (1952): 485.
63  
Vian, Action This Day, 68-69.
64  
Mathisen, Svalbard in the Changing Arctic, 35.
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he saw “no military advantage in establishing a garrison” in the
archipelago.65
The cos Committee’s discussions turned to what to do in light
of what they had learned. The economic advantages to stopping
the flow of Spitzbergen coal to Norway remained. “Germany’s war
effort would mainly be affected by the loss of the bunker coal which
would have to be made good out of the surplus production from
Eastern Germany via the Baltic,” a Ministry of Economic Warfare
representative explained to the Chiefs. “This would throw a further
strain on German transport. From this point of view, the Ministry
of Economic Warfare would like to see the mines put out of action, if
there was no other way of denying our enemies the advantages derived
from this coal.” Furthermore, the Norwegian miners on Spitzbergen
had six months of supplies left, while the Soviets only had five
weeks’ worth (with no prospect of resupply because the Soviets were
unwilling to send ships to the archipelago). In this context, the cos
decided that the Allies would benefit if the miners were evacuated
from Spitzbergen.66
Having reconsidered Flaxman, the cos tasked the jps to revise
the operation to accomplish the following:
a) evacuate the Soviet miners to the Soviet Union;
b) bring the Norwegian miners to the uk to mine coal;
c) destroy the coal mining facilities in Spitzbergen;
d) destroy the wireless and meteorological stations which supplied
Germany with weather data.67
“The essence of the operation is speed”68 to minimize the chance of
German interference, the jps concluded. The jps called for a much
smaller force of about 400 men, built around a company of Canadian
infantry from the Edmonton Regiment and a company of Royal
Chiefs of Staff Committee, Spitzbergen Draft Report, 9 August 1941, TNA, file
CAB/80/59/0/1.
66  
Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, Spitzbergen Draft Report, 9 August 1941,
TNA, file CAB/80/59/0/1. See also Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, 6 August
1941, TNA, file WO 106/1995A. On the political fallout of the handling of the
operation with Norway, see Mr. Eden to Mr. Collier, 6 August 1941, TNA, file
FO/954/23B/0/105 and Mann, British Policy and Strategy towards Norway, 45–47.
67  
Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, 9 August 1941, TNA, file CAN/79/13/0/1.
68  
Joint Planning Committee Meeting, Operation “GAUNTLET”, 11 August 1941,
TNA, CAB 84/34.
65  
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Canadian Engineers. The artillery and supporting occupational
troops were cut, and a small detachment of Kent Corp Troops, Royal
Engineers (specially trained for commando demolitions of machinery
and port installations) added in their place. Designated “Force 111,”
these troops could still defend themselves against a German air
attack during their short stay at Spitzbergen using slit trenches and
dispersion. A single ship, the Empress of Canada (already allotted
to Flaxman), could transport the whole force. While this vessel
returned the Russian miners to the Soviet Union, Force 111 could
carry out the demolitions of the mines on Spitzbergen. If the enemy
managed to sink the Empress, the Canadians and the Norwegians
could be embarked on the escorting British cruisers and destroyers
and returned to England from Spitzbergen. Brigadier Potts would
be in charge of land operations while overall command of the revised
Flaxman, now called Operation Gauntlet, would fall to Rear-Admiral
Vian.69
Given that the operation had direct implications for Norwegian
and Russian nationals, the British plan needed the consent of its
Allies. Vian personally explained the situation to King Haakon VII of
Norway, who was living in exile in Britain, and to Ambassador Maisky.
The king, concerned for his people on Spitzbergen, supported the new
evacuation plan as long as damage to Norwegian mining facilities was
minimal. Maisky, however, thought little of the plan because it did
not involve the killing of Germans. “I undertook to do my best,” Vian
promised, “to include this in the programme.”70 Nonetheless, when
Maisky met with Eden on 11 August, he insisted that occupying
Spitzbergen was pivotal to the Soviet aim of safeguarding the Allies’
northern supply route to the Soviet Union. Rather than withdrawing
Soviet miners from the archipelago, Maisky reiterated his preference
of arming them and leaving them in place for the winter. A frustrated
Eden convinced Maisky and his naval advisor to meet with the cos
and the Norwegians to discuss the new evacuation plan.71 At that
meeting, the Norwegian prime minister stated that his government
fully realized the importance of denying the coal to the Germans,
as well as the dangers to the miners if the Germans bombed them.
Accordingly, he agreed to the destruction of the coal mines but wanted
Ibid.
Vian, Action This Day, 70.
71  
Mr. Eden to Sir S. Cripps, 11 August 1941, TNA, file FO/954/24B/0/61.
69  
70  
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his people evacuated. Turning to the Soviets, the Chiefs explained
why occupying Spitzbergen would subject its civil population to an
unacceptably high risk of bombardment, with the highly flammable
wooden buildings portending a high rate of civilian casualties from
exposure. Following this logic, Maisky agreed to recommend the
evacuation of the Soviet miners to his government.72
The Canadians at Inverary ceased their training late in the
afternoon on 13 August. Boarding the Empress that evening, they
arrived back in Glasgow the following day where the Patricias and
the bulk of the Eddies departed, their trains returning them to their
camps at Oxted. The Empress was unloaded and then reloaded
with kit and supplies specific to Gauntlet. A Norwegian contingent
of soldiers boarded the ship, along with a Soviet embassy official,
who carried a letter from his government to the Soviet consul in
Spitzbergen.73 By the morning of 18 August, the men of Force 111
onboard the Empress sailed, with a naval escort, for a still undisclosed
destination—although the involvement of the Norwegians hinted to
where they were going.74 Buoyed with enthusiasm at the prospect of
seeing action, the Canadians conducted boat drills as the Empress
sailed north between the inner and outer Hebrides. Shortly afterwards
the aircraft carrier hms Argus and her destroyers dropped behind
the stern of the Empress, replaced as escorts by the cruisers and
destroyers of Vian’s Force K.75

operation gauntlet
On the morning of 21 August, the Empress of Canada’s anchor hit
the water off Hyalfjord, Iceland. There to refuel along with Force K,
the Empress found herself surrounded by a large number of American
naval ships, most prominently the battleship uss New Mexico. The
Betraying an insecurity regarding the sovereign status of Spitzbergen, the
Norwegian prime minister stated his preference that if the Soviets decide not to
evacuate, that no arms should be shipped to their miners. If the Soviets insist on
staying, he would like to reconsider his decision to evacuate the Norwegian miners.
Chiefs of Staff Committee, Annex, 12 August 1941, TNA, file CAB 121/442.
73  
War Office for Foreign Office, Operation “GAUNTLET”, 17 August 1941, TNA,
file WO 106/1998.
74  
Bittner, “Descent in the North,” 29.
75  
War Diary “X” Canadian Field Cash, R.C.A.P.C. Force 111, 18 August 1941,
LAC, file RG24 C-3 Vol. 17489.
72  
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Canadian officers aboard the Empress soon found themselves playing
hosts to visitors from the dry American ships who were eager to
avail themselves of the ship’s stores of alcohol.76 As the festivities
commenced, Brigadier Potts departed the Empress for the Nigeria to
meet with Vian and work out the details of the operation order for
Gauntlet.77 By midnight, the general plan had been drawn up, the
Americans returned to their ships after various rounds of toasts, and
Force K and the Empress were once again underway.78
With Iceland well behind the force, Potts held conferences revealing
to his officers and men that they were heading to Spitzbergen. Due
to strict operational secrecy, “only a very few senior officers of the
force had the slightest inkling of the real plan.”79 The men cheered
when told that they were mounting a raid on Spitzbergen, but were
disappointed to learn that they were not expected to engage any
German forces. As the officers of Force 111 stayed up into the night
working out the details of the plan for their respective units, the
soldiers manning the anti-aircraft guns on the upper decks of the
Empress donned the leather jerkins and heavy sheepskin coats that
had been specially provided for the mission. “The men were saying it
was the first time their feet had been cold in August,” the Saskatoon
Light Infantry’s war diary recorded. “This expedition is proceeding
further north than any military expedition in history.”80
Force K arrived in the Isfjord of West Spitzbergen, the main
waterway along which the Norwegian and Soviet settlements were
situated, early on 25 August. The previous night, Force K had
rendezvoused with a ragtag convoy of fishing trawlers and an oiler
sent to support Gauntlet.81 These ships and the rest of Force K
followed a scouting party of Walrus aircraft that had launched from

Ibid.
Stacey, “The Canadians at Spitsbergen,” 60.
78  
Chris Mann and Christer Jorgensen, Hitler’s Arctic War: The German Campaigns
in Norway, Finland, and the USSR 1940-1945 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2003),
118; Mann, British Policy and Strategy towards Norway, 12; Henrik O. Lunde, Hitler’s
Pre-Emptive War : The Battle for Norway, 1940 (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2009),
551. For the most comprehensive look at Iceland during the war, see Donald Bittner,
“The British Occupation of Iceland, 1940-1942” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Missouri, 1974).
79  
Stacey, “The Canadians at Spitsbergen,” 53.
80  
War Diary Saskatoon Light Infantry, Exercise Heather, 23 August 1941, LAC, file
RG24 C-3 Vol. 17489.
81  
Diary of Ross Munro, 24 August 1941, LAC, file RG24 C-3 Vol 12298.
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Major Bury with Edmonton Regiment, Barentsburg. [Canadian Army Photo]

the cruisers up the Isfjord, with the Empress dropping anchor offshore
the main Soviet settlement of Barentsburg. The soldiers emerging
on deck found themselves confronted with a sense of “immobility
and silence.”82 As the Canadians took in their first impressions of
Spitzbergen, the destroyers, trawlers, and motorboats accompanying
the Empress came alongside her, picking up detachments of soldiers
to be ferried to the other settlements that were scattered along the
western coast of the island.
The Canadians landed first at Barentsburg, the major Soviet
settlement at Spitzbergen.83 The town was home to just over
1,200 men, women and children,84 built around “three dreary but
surprisingly well-built barracks,”85 with some fifty-five wooden
buildings in all. The town had an enclosed small gauge electric railway
for coal transport that led from the coal pile along the shoreline at
the foot of the town up to the primary mine shaft above the town and
Jean Brilhac, The Road to Liberty: The Story of One Hundred and Eight-Six Men
Who Escaped (London: Peter Davies, 1945), 201.
83  
Stacy, “The Canadians at Spitsbergen,” 60–61.
84  
Report on Barentsburg Party by Major Bruce Blake, 4 September 1941, LAC, file
RG24 C-3 Vol. 17489.
85  
Alexander Glen, Footholds Against a Whirlwind (London: Hutchinson of London,
1975), 81–82.
82  
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Spitsbergen 1941. [Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War Vol. I by
CP Stacey.]
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off to another mine shaft roughly 4 miles to the north.86 Along the
beach in front of Barentsburg stood a party of a dozen dour Soviet
officials, clad in “dark caps and blue padded tunics with black drill
trousers.”87 Arrayed around them were many of the townspeople of
Barentsburg, silently regarding their visitors. After a brief exchange
with the Soviet embassy official P.D. Yerzin and their local hosts,
Potts and his officers climbed a long set of stairs leading up the steep
slope to conference in the administration building with the Soviet
consul.88 There, Yerzin gave the consul a letter from Ambassador
Maisky directing him to cooperate with the Canadians and evacuate
Spitzbergen’s Soviet citizens.89 The Canadians left at the boats found
the townspeople to be friendly and welcoming, quickly helping the
troops to unload their supplies for the command post they intended
to establish in the town.90
Meanwhile, other detachments of Force 111 fanned out across
Spitzbergen. Their first priority was the evacuation of the Soviet
miners from their settlements of Barentsburg, Grumantby, and
Pyramiden.91 Similar to Barentsburg, the inhabitants at the other
Soviet settlements gave Force 111 a friendly greeting upon their
arrival.92 Allotted only twenty-four hours to evacuate, the Soviets
were very cooperative, assisting Force 111 in both the unloading of
Canadian supplies, the loading of their own baggage, and in the
demolitions of their mining infrastructure.93 In Barentsburg, however,
the Soviet consul soon interrupted this cooperation. Described by
an accompanying British official as “an unctuous little man with a
diverting squint,” Consul Wolnuhi was openly apprehensive about
repatriation to the Soviet Union and quickly turned to drinking after
his meeting with Potts and Yezin.94 Fortified with large quantities
Special War Diary 2 CDN INF BDE, Spitzbergen Expedition, 25 August 1941,
LAC, file RG24 C-3 Vol 17489.
87  
Ross Munro, Gauntlet to Overlord: The Story of the Canadian Army (Toronto:
Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1946), 284.
88  
Ibid.
89  
Special War Diary 2 CDN INF BDE, Spitzbergen Expedition, 25 August 1941,
LAC, file RG24 C-3 Vol 17489.
90  
Army Film Unit Secret Dope Sheet, 9 September 1941, LAC, file RG24 C-3 Vol
17489.
91  
Stevens, A City Goes to War, 211.
92  
Stacey, “The Canadians at Spitsbergen,” 61.
93  
Report by Major Bruce Blake in “EMPRESS OF CANADA” on Embarkation of
Russians at Barentsburg, 28 August 1941, TNA, file WO 106/1942.
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of alcohol by mid-afternoon, he suddenly demanded that the heavy
machinery and mining equipment of Barentsburg also be loaded
aboard the Empress, despite having already agreed to restrictions
imposed by the tight operational schedule and the limited space
aboard ship.95 In response to his demands, Soviet officials immediately
ceased cooperating with the Canadians, throwing the tight schedule of
Gauntlet into jeopardy. Despite the best persuasive efforts of military
liaison officer Major Blake Bruce, Wolnuhi would not budge.96 His
demands could not have come at a worst time. Dead in the water
and loading civilians, the Empress was a sitting duck for a potential
German air attack.
Potts was quickly summoned to Barentsburg to deal with the
troublesome consul. Wolnuhi continued to be obstinate, declaring
that he would only drop his demands if ordered to do so by Vian (the
overall commander of Gauntlet as indicated in the letter from Maisky).
While Potts left to signal Vian aboard the Nigeria, Major Bruce’s
alternative effort to induce Wolnuhi to cooperation came to fruition.
Bruce had made sure that two additional bottles of champagne and
a bottle of Madeira made their way into the consul’s hands. Before
Potts received a response from Vian, Wolnuhi had degraded into a
drunken stupor and then fell asleep.97 The consul’s officials carried
him aboard the Empress and proved more cooperative in helping
the Canadians finish their evacuation of Soviet citizens. Just after
midnight, the Empress was underway for Archangel, escorted by
Vian’s Nigeria and half of Force K’s destroyers.98
Meanwhile the Norwegian communities, expecting a permanent
occupation, were “astonished and upset” to learn that they were to
be evacuated.99 After appropriate explanations from the Norwegian
officials and the soldiers of Force 111, they accepted the requirement
for evacuation, which proceeded with minimal difficulties. Over the
next few days the remaining half of Force K visited the various
Norwegian settlements, depositing detachments from Force 111 to

Bittner, “Descent in the North,” 31.
Report by Major Bruce Blake in “EMPRESS OF CANADA” on Embarkation
of Russians at Barentsburg, 28 August 1941, TNA, file WO 106/1942 and Mann,
British Policy and Strategy towards Norway, 49.
97  
Mann, British Policy and Strategy towards Norway, 49.
98  
Bittner, “Descent in the North,” 31, and Stacey, “The Canadians at Spitsbergen,”
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The Norwegians readying for evacuation from Longyearbyen. [Library and Archives Canada

e011184640]

conduct demolitions and collect miners and trappers, whom they
concentrated at the main Norwegian settlement of Longyearby. The
Norwegians manning the weather and wireless stations broadcasted
false reports of heavy and persistent fog to discourage any German
reconnaissance flights over the archipelago during the operation. The
deception worked.100
As had been the case with the Soviets, the relations between
Force 111 and the Norwegian officials proved challenging. Einer
Sverdrup,101 the director of the mines at Longyearby, argued with
Potts over the proposed destruction of the mining facilities. Motivated
to preserve the mines for postwar Norway, Sverdrup sought to remain
in Spitzbergen with a small caretaker party. Even when the sappers
repeatedly assured him that the demolitions would be made in such a
manner as to allow the mines to restart later in a reasonable period
of time, Sverdrup still refused to leave. When the frustrated mining

Stacey, “The Canadians at Spitsbergen,” 62.
Einer was the nephew of arctic explorer Otto Sverdrup who rose to fame while
captaining the Fram on her voyages to chart what became known as the Sverdrup
Islands in the Canadian Arctic archipelago from 1898 to 1902. Glen, Footholds
Against a Whirlwind, 82.
100  
101  
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Royal Canadian Engineer sappers fire the coal pile at Barentsburg. [Library and Archives Canada
PA-180524]

director threatened to protest to his government, Potts assured
Sverdrup that he would have every chance to do so when he arrived
in Britain in a few days’ time.102 Sverdrup had little recourse but to
acquiesce, and the demolitions of the Norwegian mines’ audits and
supporting facilities went ahead as planned.103
After an uneventful voyage, the Empress of Canada and her
escorts arrived in the White Sea on 29 August where they were met
by a Soviet destroyer flying the flag of Admiral Dolini. During his
altercation with the officers of Force 111, Consul Wolnuhi had broken
radio silence and dispatched a message to his superiors in Leningrad
alleging that the Canadians had mistreated him and the miners. The
following day Maisky took up the matter with the Foreign Office,
recounting the consul’s message.104 Word of this reached Vian aboard
the Nigeria who simply replied to the Admiralty that the consul’s
allegations were “quite untrue.”105 What could have grown into a
diplomatic incident was quickly diffused when Dolini confronted the
102  
Report by Major A.S.T. Godfrey, Operation “GAUNTLET”, 4 September 1941,
TNA, file WO 32/10090 and Elbo, “The War in Svalbard,” 486.
103  
Bittner, “Descent in the North,” 32–33.
104  
F.O. Minute, Mr. Strang, 27 August 1941, TNA, file FO 371-29489.
105  
Naval Cypher from S. O. Force “A” to Admiralty, 28 August, TNA, file FO
371/29489.
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consul, who admitted that the evacuation arrangements and the
passage to Archangel had been satisfactory.106
That afternoon, 2,000 Soviet miners and over 200 tons of their
baggage were disembarked at Archangel. The ships spent the night
offshore only to be met the following morning by a rendition of “La
Marseillaise.” Some 192 French soldiers emerged out of the fog aboard
a Soviet barge, haggard in appearance but jubilant at the sight of the
Empress. Following the Fall of France, these soldiers had been interned
in German prisoner of war camps. Their repatriation continuously
pushed off by their captors, they had escaped into the Soviet Union
only to find themselves in worse conditions. Gauntlet afforded the
various parties involved in this uncomfortable reality to return these
soldiers to Britain where they could join the Free French Forces.107
Late on 2 September the two halves of Force K were reunited in
the waters of the Isfjord to find the town of Barentsburg in flames.
Much of Force 111 had been billeted there, and the troops had been
awakened the previous morning to the alarm raised by the sentries. A
fire had broken out in a covered area of the light railway leading from
the mouth of the mine to the jetty below the town. The structure
was wooden and saturated in coal dust. The steady 18-knot wind
was channeled by the shape of the covered railway, which acted as a
flue and quickly whipped the fire into a raging inferno. Firefighting
equipment was limited and a pump fed by seawater to keep the
flames at bay broke down after a few hours of use. The troops did
everything they could to stem the blaze but, at times, they could not
get within 300 feet of the inferno due to the intense heat. Ultimately,
the fire destroyed the town.108
Despite this setback, the demolitions elsewhere on Spitzbergen
went off as planned over the next few days. Military engineers
destroyed the infrastructure supporting the mines while leaving the
mines themselves largely intact. The various railways and conveyors
that transferred the coal from the mines to piles along the shoreline
were blown-up. All of this free coal, approximately 450,000 tons, was
burned along with 225,000 gallons of oil and gasoline. Another 50,000
gallons were poured into the sea. Power plants were either disabled
through the removal of critical components or destroyed outright
Mr. Sargent to Mr. Maisky, 5 September 1941, TNA, file FO 371/29489.
For an eye-witness account of their ordeal, see Brilhac, The Road to Liberty.
108  
Bittner, “Descent in the North,” 33.
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with explosives. Radio and meteorology equipment was disabled
and wireless masts felled by charges. Motor boats and lighters, after
assisting Force 111, were sunk. Summarizing his handiwork, the head
engineer of Force 111 estimated that it would take six months of work
to put the mines of Spitzbergen back into production.109
When demolitions were completed, the vessels of Force K collected
the Canadians who were scattered across Spitzbergen and returned
them to the Empress to mingle with the 765 Norwegian civilians
and 192 French soldiers now aboard. Thus on 3 September, with
operations concluded, the Empress weighed anchor and departed
with Force K for Scotland. The voyage home was uneventful, aside
from some receptions thrown by the Free French and Norwegian
soldiers for the Canadians and crew.110 Vian, however, had received
new orders: intercept a German troop convoy sailing around Norway
for the Murmansk front. His two cruisers slipped away once the
Empress came under the air umbrella protecting British waters, and
Vian successfully engaged the German vessels just east of the North
Cape early on 7 September. In rough waters and in poor visibility
Nigeria and Aurora sunk the German training cruiser kms Bremse.
Nigeria’s bow was heavily damaged, having rammed and shorn
Bremse in half during the engagement, but she was able to limp
home without sustaining any casualties. The troop ships under escort
of Bremse managed to escape into the foul weather. In the end, Vian
had kept his promise to Maisky—he had killed Germans.111
The Empress of Canada berthed back in Glasgow on the
morning of 9 September, “her deck rails ... lined with uniformed and
un-uniformed figures curiously surveying all around them, probably
wondering what their new surroundings and temporary home were
like, and prospecting on what it held for them in their immediate
days ahead.”112 The French were taken off the ship first and almost
immediately entrained for London to join General Charles De Gaulle’s

109  
Major G. Walsh, C.R.E. Report, Force 111, 6 September 1941, LAC, file RG24
C-3 Vol 17489 and Bittner, “Descent in the North,” 33.
110  
Special War Diary 2 CDN INF BDE, Spitzbergen Expedition, 5 and 7 September
1941, LAC, file RG24 C-3 Vol 17489.
111  
Vian, Action This Day, 72. The two troop ships being escorted by Bremse carried
1500 soldiers bound for Dielt’s army. Woodman, The Arctic Convoys, 1941-1945, 36.
112  
Immigration Officer’s Report, Norwegian Refugees & Company from Spitzbergen,
17 September 1941, TNA, file HO 213/1759.
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nascent Free French Forces.113 By noon the bulk of the Canadians
began to disembark the Empress, taken by truck to a transit camp
to await trains that would return them to their barracks in Oxted.114
The Norwegians were the last to leave. Billeted in a nearby school for
a few days as British immigration and security forces vetted them,
most of the Norwegians who did not volunteer for service with the
Free Norwegian Forces were eventually sent to work the coal mines
of the remote Orkney Islands.115
The Canadians arrived back at Oxted the following morning,
dragging themselves off their overnight trains from Scotland to be
granted a twenty-four hour leave. Looking back on Gauntlet, the
Saskatoon Light Infantry’s war diarist offered the opinion that “the
expedition was a wonderful experience,” their only real complaint
that “they had no Bosche to shoot.” In the meantime, the Canadians
determined that they would make the most of the short leave granted
to them as a reward for their hard work at Spitzbergen. After all, while
Spitzbergen was a small event from the perspective of the overall war,
“five weeks away from their lady friends seemed a long time to them.”116

taking stock of gauntlet
In summing up Operation Gauntlet, C.P. Stacey concluded that “the
force employed was small and its object limited; this was, in fact, a
minor operation whose importance could easily be exaggerated.”117
Nevertheless, the small force and limited objectives reflected the
complexities of coalition warfare. The evacuation of 2,000 Russian and
765 Norwegians from unoccupied Spitzbergen and the demolition of
the supporting mining infrastructure in the archipelago followed ten
weeks of diplomatic negotiations between Britain, the Soviet Union,
113  
Immigration Officer’s Report, Volunteers for the Allied Forces, 28 September
1941, TNA, file HO 213/1759.
114  
Special War Diary 2 CDN INF BDE, Spitzbergen Expedition, 10 September
1941, LAC, file RG24 C-3 Vol 17489.
115  
Immigration Officer’s Report, Norwegian Refugees & Company from Spitzbergen,
17 September 1941, TNA, file HO 213/1759 and Orkney Constabulary to the Under
Secretary of State, Home Office, Aliens Department, 10 November 1941, TNA, file
HO 213/1759.
116  
War Diary Saskatoon Light Infantry, Exercise Heather, 9 September 1941, LAC,
file RG24 C-3 Vol. 17489.
117  
Stacey, Six Years of War, 306.
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Norway, and Canada. During this process two operational plans were
drawn up, with Flaxman rescaled into Gauntlet as the Chiefs of
Staff sought a military rationale to justify a politically-motivated
operation. This smaller evacuation scheme disappointed the Soviet
Union, satisfied a reluctant Britain, and Norway acquiesced. As
Gauntlet unfolded, the Canadians experienced difficulties with local
Soviet and Norwegian officials that threw important aspects of
the operation into jeopardy and touched off two minor diplomatic
incidents.118 Conversely, Gauntlet allowed for the quiet transfer
of Soviet-held French soldiers to Free French Forces, removing a
diplomatic impediment that illustrates the awkward political
baggage that had to be overcome between the newfound allies.
Ultimately, Operation Gauntlet was a “diplomatic raid”119
motivated by political pressure for early British military action
to support their new and hard-pressed Russian allies. From this
strategic perspective, the operation had little impact. Enthusiastic
British and Canadian media coverage following Gauntlet’s conclusion
greatly exaggerated its significance, exacerbating Russian disappoint
with Britain’s meagre efforts to support them militarily. Sir Stafford
Cripps, the British ambassador in Moscow, reported to the Foreign
Office on 9 September 1941:
The account of the Spitzbergen operation by the B.B.C. today… was
disastrous as far as this country is concerned. It was apparently an
attempt to make out that this operation was a dangerous and important
one… In view of their recent pressure on us to do something big in the
West, this will be taken as an elaborate and stupid attempt to magnify
a simple and safe operation into something large and important and will
either be resented or laughed at.120

118  
While the Russian consul’s allegations of mistreatment at the hands of the
Canadians were resolved with Russian officials as recounted, Einer Sverdrup’s
protest of excessive destruction of his mines by the Canadians were taken up by
his government after the completion of Gauntlet, leading to a Norwegian request
for compensation. See Laurence Collier reporting RE: Norwegian Complaint about
Canadians, 6 March 1942, TNA, FO 371/32928. Sverdrup was able to use this
pressure to help secure British naval support for an ill-fated Norwegian caretaker
party led by himself that returned to Spitzbergen the following summer. See Glen,
Footholds Against the Whirlwind, 94-95, 102-06.
119  
Coutu, “Le quartier général des opérations combinées et l’expédition canadobritannique au Spitzberg,” 48.
120  
Sir S. Cripps to Foreign Office, 9 September 1941, TNA, file WO 106/2001.
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Britain’s No. 30 Military Mission in Moscow elaborated on this in a
report to the War Office, calling the results of the overblown news
coverage “psychologically tragic” for the Russians. Pointing out that
these new allies were “continually begging us to do something on
a scale sufficient to relieve the pressure on them,” he noted “that
so fulsome a description of this landing operation on an island full
of Russians will strike a very false note here.” 121 From a Russian
perspective, Operation Gauntlet—like the other minor operations
undertaken along the Norwegian and French coasts—was no
substitute for the demanded second front.122
The original Soviet geostrategic premise motivating Operation
Gauntlet was that Spitzbergen could be used as a base to protect the
vital sea lane from Britain to Russia. When this premise was scuttled
after Vian’s reconnaissance of Spitzbergen, the cos settled upon an
economic warfare rationale: depriving Germany of a source of coal
while securing Soviet and Norwegian miners to support the Allied war
effort.123 An additional benefit of Gauntlet, underappreciated by its
planners, saw the raid temporarily disrupt the flow of valuable weather
data to Germany with which they planned their military campaigns.124

121  
No.30 Military Mission Moscow to War Office, 9 September 1941, TNA, file WO
106/2001.
122  
Christopher Mann notes that this argument for coastal raids as a surrogate
second front was taken to its logical conclusion with the tragic Dieppe Raid. Mann,
British Policy and Strategy towards Norway, 50, 92–93.
123  
Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, 9 August 1941, TNA, file CAN/79/13/0/1.
124  
William Dege, War North of 80: The Last German Arctic Weather Station of
World War II (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2004); and Franz Selinger
and Alexander Glen, “Arctic Meteorological Operations and Counter-Operations
During World War II,” Polar Record 21:135 (1983): 563. As the weather that affects
much of Europe comes from its north and west, Spitzbergen’s weather reports
played an important role in Germany’s compilation of continental weather forecasts.
Throughout the war, Germany used these forecasts to shape many of their military
campaigns, from postponing their invasion of France to the planning of bombing
raids against Britain. This weather data was even used to set the date for their
invasion of the Soviet Union. See Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World At Arms: A
Global History of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994),
122, 204, 764; Dege, War North of 80; Selinger and Glen, “Arctic Meteorological
Operations,” 563; and MIS, British Commandos, 114. Germany established manned
and automated weather stations across the Arctic and on Spitzbergen soon after
Gauntlet which operated until the end of the Second World War. On these stations,
see Dege, War North of 80. Given the size, isolation and ruggedness of Spitzbergen
it would have been impossible for the Allies to have prevented the establishment of
these stations with even a large garrison of the archipelago. See Selinger and Glen,
“Arctic Meteorological Operations,” 564.
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To these benefits must be added the counter-factual argument made
by the jps that the evacuation of Spitzbergen’s miners prevented a
humanitarian crisis from developing: either in the form of the Soviet
miners running out of supplies as Spitzbergen slipped into the frozen
and lingering darkness of an Arctic winter, or of German incendiary
bombing of these miners, leading to mass exposure.125 Had either
scenario come to pass, the British would have been hard pressed to
respond.
Despite Gauntlet proving superfluous to the protection of the
sea lane from Britain to Russia, the operation demonstrated “the
advantages of sea power and the options available to the nation which
possesses it” to quote Bittner’s assessment.126 Given British control of
the sea, they were able to dispatch the force with appropriate naval
assets to mitigate the risks if the Germans opposed the landing and to
ensure that the soldiers arrived safely. A report on British commando
operations produced by the us military intelligence branch in August
1942, observed:
During the most dangerous part of the voyage the troop transport
was safeguarded by an aircraft carrier and land-based aircraft patrols,
as well as by the three destroyers, so that it could have maximum
protection against air attack. When distance had reduced the danger
from German bombers, the aircraft carrier left the expedition and two
cruisers joined the destroyer escort as replacements. The cruisers and
the destroyers were the best type of vessels to deal with a possible
opposed landing and to safeguard the transport in evacuating the
Russians to Archangel.127

Equally important, the Royal Navy had the capacity to actually
carry the Russian miners and their families to Russia and also to
move the Norwegians at Spitzbergen to the United Kingdom. These
nationals, in turn, could then support the Allied war effort.
From a Canadian perspective, Gauntlet was a tactical success
that boosted the moral of the participating troops. The limited
objectives of evacuating the miners, destroying the coal mining

125  
Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, Spitzbergen Draft Report, 9 August 1941,
TNA, file CAB/80/59/0/1.
126  
Bittner, “Descent in the North,” 33.
127  
MIS, British Commandos, 116.

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol26/iss2/16

30

Dean and Lackenbauer: Conceiving and Executing Operation Gauntlet
DEAN & LACKENBAUER

31

facilities, and demolishing the wireless and meteorological stations on
Spitzbergen were all met efficiently and effectively.128 The Canadians
maintained the utmost operational secrecy from the conception of
Gauntlet to its execution, preventing the Germans from finding out
about and interfering with the operation.129 Furthermore, the ongoing
transmission of deceptive weather reports from Spitzbergen by local
Norwegian operators during the Allied evacuation concealed from the
enemy that anything unusual was taking place on the islands and
thus discouraged German aerial reconnaissance.130
The composition of Force 111 showed the effectiveness of
integrating a balanced group of individuals with appropriate skills
and expertise to handle all phases of the mission. Infantry formed
the largest element of the force, which reflected the possibility of an
opposed landing and the need for a critical mass of soldiers to oversee
the evacuation efforts. Engineers, who were charged with carrying out
the main object of the task-demolitions, formed the next largest group,
led by a highly qualified mining engineer. An appropriate number of
signal troops also succeeded in seizing, operating deceptively, and
ultimately destroying the radio stations on Spitzbergen in cooperation
with local civilians. Furthermore, the inclusion of a small detachment
of twenty-five Free Norwegian troops also proved beneficial to this
alliance operation, lending “greater validity to the mission in the
eyes of the Norwegian residents, who had to stand by and see their
property destroyed at a time when it was not under control of the
enemy nor facing direct threat of attack.”131 In turn, this helped
to ensure favourable civilian perceptions of the military force and
indicated its determination to act in the civil interest.
Gauntlet’s tactical success can also be attributed to the unity of
its command. The British Chiefs of Staff assigned supreme command
of the expedition while at sea to the naval commander because of
the vulnerability of the naval units to air attack. “This assignment
of authority placed the greatest responsibility for the safety of the
expedition and its ships on the individual—the naval commander—
who alone controlled the means of evacuating the comparatively small

Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, 9 August 1941, TNA, file CAN/79/13/0/1.
Capelotti, The Svalbard Archipelago, 59–60; Stacey, “The Canadians at
Spitsbergen,” 71.
130  
MIS, British Commandos, 116.
131  
Ibid., 115.
128  
129  

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2017

31

Canadian Military History, Vol. 26 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 16
32

Conceiving and Executing Operation Gauntlet

Brigadier A.E. Potts takes the salute during the final parade in Longyearbyen. [Library and
Archives Canada e011184643]

force of soldiers,” a wartime report noted.132 Nevertheless, Brigadier
Potts was given command of all operations ashore. “In selecting
Brigadier Potts for the command of this detachment of the Canadian
Corps,” General A.G.L. McNaughton wrote, “both General Pearkes
and I had every confidence that he would discharge his responsibilities
to the satisfaction of all concerned and I am very happy that this has
been so.”133
The main challenge facing the Canadians came in managing
the civilian dimension of the operation at Spitzbergen. Brigadier
Potts showed flexibility in his approach, recognizing the need
to carry out assessments of the local civilian environment and to
adapt plans (where possible) to meet local needs. In dealing with
the Russian consul, Potts used his command authority and skills of
persuasion—aided by clever tactics such as plying the Russian consul
with alcohol—to secure cooperation from civil authorities. Similarly,
although the original plans provided for a small maintenance party

Ibid., 115.
11 September 1941, A.G.L. McNaughton to General Sir John Dill, Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, LAC, RG 24, vol. 12298, file “3 CDN CORPS-3 SPECIAL
EXPEDITION No.111.”
132  
133  
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of Norwegians to remain on Spitzbergen, during Pott’s disagreement
with the Norwegian mining official, a spokesperson for the resident
community requested on behalf of the Norwegian inhabitants that
everyone be evacuated to Britain. Fear of reprisals against anyone
who remained, or against their families back in Norway, justified this
argument. Potts considered this request in an impartial manner and,
after consulting with Vian, agreed.134 This display of pragmatism
and sensitivity helped to make the mission successful. Although
questions would later arise about whether the conduct of the
mission met legal and moral obligations to the local population, the
accusations launched at the Canadian soldiers for discourteousness,
misbehaviour, or malfeasance in the burning of Barentsburg proved
unfounded. Instead, the interactions between the military force and
the allied populations on Spitzbergen proved overwhelmingly friendly
and cooperative.
Operation Gauntlet brought additional benefits for the Canadian
forces serving in Britain. Stacey observed that this “adventurous
enterprise” had a “useful effect upon morale,” providing expectations of
future employment against the enemy.135 Furthermore, McNaughton’s
biographer John Swettenham explained that “the successful outcome
of this minor operation” meant that the Canadian corps commander’s
“powers were widened: he was now permitted to take immediate action
to commit his troops to raids or similar operations.”136 None of these
operations would take the Canadians back to the European Arctic,
however. Instead, subsequent wartime developments would encourage

134  
Notes on subsequent Meeting held at Longyearby, 31 August 1941, TNA, file
WO/32/10090.
135  
Stacey, CMHQ Historical Report No.56, “The Spitzbergen Operation,” para. 112.
136  
Swettenham, McNaughton, 182. The War Committee of Cabinet discussed the
new powers that McNaughton was granted specifically for the Spitzbergen operation
and agreed to generalize this authority to cover future, similar projects of a temporary
nature. “While suggesting McNaughton should use his own judgement whether to set
in such cases,” the committed noted, “he would notify Minister of National Defence
in general terms prior to event where practicable.” Secretary of State for External
Affairs to Canadian High Commission, 10 November 1941, LAC, file RG25 A-2 Vol.
829. In April 1942, a small party of Canadians participated in a British raid on the
French coast near Boulogne but, failing to get ashore, they took no active part in
engaging the Germans.
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Canadian decision makers to re-conceptualize their country’s own
northern expanses as a potential theatre of operation.137
◆

◆

◆

◆

about the authors
Ryan Dean is a PhD candidate in the department of political science at
the University of Calgary. His dissertation examines how various Canadian
stakeholders have perceived, constructed, and/or deconstructed security
threats in the Arctic for government policy adoption. His recent publications
include Canada’s Northern Strategy under the Harper Conservatives: Key
Speeches and Documents on Sovereignty, Security, and Governance, 200615 (Documents on Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security No. 6., 2016)
with Whitney Lackenbauer; and “Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships: Adrift in
Inflationary Waters” in Canadian Naval Review (2015), winner of the 2015
Canadian Naval Memorial Trust Essay Competition.

P. Whitney Lackenbauer, PhD., is a professor in the department
of history at St. Jerome’s University in the University of Waterloo and
Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of the 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group
based in Yellowknife. He is the 2017-18 Killam Visiting Scholar at the
University of Calgary, and a senior fellow with the Bill Graham Centre for
Contemporary International History. His recent books include Vigilans:
A Short History of 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (2015), The
Canadian Rangers: A Living History, 1942-2012 (2013, shortlisted for the
Dafoe prize), Canada and the Changing Arctic: Sovereignty, Security and
Stewardship (co-authored 2011), and Arctic Front: Defending Canada in
the Far North (co-authored 2008, winner of the 2009 Donner Prize)

137  
See, for example, J. Tuzo Wilson, “Winter Manoeuvres in Canada,” Canadian
Geographical Journal, vol.32-33 (1946): 88-93; Kenneth C. Eyre, “Custos Borealis:
The Military in the Canadian North” (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of
London - King’s College, 1981); Hugh Halliday, Recapturing the North: Exercises
‘Eskimo,’ ‘Polar Bear’ and ‘Lemming’ 1945, Canadian Military History, Vol. 6, No.
2 (Autumn 1997): 29-38; and P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Peter Kikkert, Lessons
in Arctic Operations: The Canadian Army Experience, 1945-1956, Documents on
Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security (DCASS) No. 7 (Calgary and Waterloo:
Centre for Military, Strategic and Security Studies/Centre on Foreign Policy and
Federalism, 2016).

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol26/iss2/16

34

Dean and Lackenbauer: Conceiving and Executing Operation Gauntlet
DEAN & LACKENBAUER

35

appendix a: composition of force 111138
Unit

Officers

Enlisted
Men

Headquarters, 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade

5

12

Signals Section, 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade

2

32

3 Field Company, Royal Canadian Engineers

5

191

D Company, plus one platoon C Company, 6
Edmonton Regiment

153

Saskatoon Light Infantry
(Composite detachment)

Gun) 4

80

Detachment, Royal Canadian Army Medical 3
Corps (from 5 Canadian Field Ambulance)

23

“X” Canadian Field Cash Office, Royal Canadian 1
Army Pay Corps

2

Empress of Canada Ship’s Staff (from Edmonton 2
Regiment)

5

Canadian

(Machine

Total Canadian 29

498

British
Detachment, Kent Corps Troops, Royal Engineers 4

31

Detachment, 992 Docks Operations Company, 1
Royal Engineers

18

Detachment, “B” Section 1 Motor Boat Company, 1
Royal Army Service Corps

19

Detachment, 60 Detail Issue Depot, Royal Army Service Corps

6

“D” Field Cash Office, Royal Army Pay Corps

1

2

Royal Engineers (Movement Control), Attached 2 Canadian Brigade Headquarters

3

Intelligence Corps

3

-

Army Film Unit

1

-

Major H.C. Smith, Liaison Officer**

1

-

Captain E.W. Proctor, Royal Engineers

1

1

138  
See GAUNTLET-FLAXMAN, Appendix VI - Order of Battle, 22 December
1943, TNA, file DEFE 2/228.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2017

35

Canadian Military History, Vol. 26 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 16
36

Conceiving and Executing Operation Gauntlet

Unit

Officers

Enlisted
Men

Major A.W. Salmon, Royal Army Service Corps

1

-

Total British 14

79

Norwegian
Detachment, Norwegian Infantry

3

22

TOTAL

46

599

*This figure includes civilian journalist Ross Munro (Canadian Press).
** Canadian serving with British forces.
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